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Introduction: Due Progress of "Due Process"
By JuLris STONE*
I welcome the privilege of introducing this symposium both for the
interest of its subject and the distinction of its contributors. The
combination of an up-to-the-hour review of due process with a team
led by Mr. Justice Tobriner is irresistible.
Inevitably, such a symposium has focused on the vigorous, if dis-
orderly pressure to extend the due process requirement to newer areas
of state action. Thus, its application (or non-application) to welfare
beneficiaries, is penetratingly surveyed here by Professor Barbara
Brudno; Mr. Justice Tobriner and Harold Cohen have considered its
application to classes of persons such as prisoners and parolees whose
human rights have been historically left (apart from the limited atten-
tion which a writ of habeas corpus could occasionally attract) to the
internal rules and discretion of the detaining agency; and Dean Reynolds
Seitz analyzes its applicability to tenured teachers. Such a symposium
is bound to reagitate, as in Professor Norman Vieira's analysis of the
opinions in 1973 abortion cases,1 the validity of the general (but, after
all, only quarter century or so old) assumption that substantive due
process is dead and gone. With this go the questions whether stand-
ards are indeed not available for substantive due process in the same
way as we have come to think they are in relation to procedural due
process; and whether the rejection of Lochner v. New York2 in the
context of judicial review of socio-economic legislative innovations is
to continue to prevail in our very much changed and ever more rapidly
changing contexts.
This last is a matter of momentous import, whether we agree with
Professor Vieira's view, or with the more activistic view which he re-
* Professor of Law, University of New South Wales; Distinguished Professor
of Jurisprudence and International Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law. O.B.E. 1928, B.C.L. 1929, D.C.L. 1935, Oxford; LL.D., 1930, Leeds (honoris
causa); SJ.D., 1932, Harvard.
1. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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jects. After all, as Justice Tobriner and Harold Cohen show, proce-
dural due process itself still demands, even at this stage, the invention
of new criteria for its applicability to important areas of human claims.
If we are dogmatically to deny for all time the possibility of revival
of substantive due process, we have to do so on some less vulnerable
basis than either history or the absence of clear-cut criteria. For their
study shows that the ambit and prescriptions even of mere procedural
due process are found to vary according to the nature and degree of
the claims and claimants which due process is invoked to protect.
Professor Brudno's analysis of the welfare benefits field also bears
in to challenge any dogmatism. Her points are nonetheless cogent
to this matter, even when they are made alio intuito. She shows the
correlation between the decisions encroaching on Goldberg v. Kelly
3
and their basic premise that welfare benefits are received not
as a matter of "right," but as a matter of "privilege" or even public
charity or bounty. 4 And, if we succeed in divorcing intellectual judg-
ment from our value-preferences, we would have to admit that, both
historically and analytically, an argument could be made justifying the
Court's taking "privilege" rather than "right" as the starting point for
legal argument.
What this leads me to (without knowing whether the learned
writer would agree) is a certain skepticism about the grounds on which
we have come to accept that there is precision of criteria and range
for administering procedural due process. Conversely, it leads me also
to be skeptical of the assumption that, because such precision has not
hitherto been found in substantive due process, the latter is doomed
never to return from the limbo to which rather more than a generation of
courts, professors and practitioners have relegated it. For if even main-
stream procedural due process can be fostered and channeled or, on the
other hand, blocked and dried up, by merely adopting one or the other of
two conflicting premises, the exclusive legal validity of neither of
which is demonstrable, we have a different situation. We then need
a better reason than is yet available for thinking that the Supreme
Court is fettered forever by the positions on substantive due process
3. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (pre-termination evidentiary hearing
necessary to provide welfare recipient with procedural due process).
4. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) ($25 filing fee for welfare
recipients to obtain judicial review of adverse administrative ruling); Richardson v.
Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1971) (refusal to adjudicate the procedural rights of disa-
bility insurance recipients); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319 (1971) (visitation
of AFDC mother by welfare worker not a violation of Fourth Amendment procedural
safeguards).
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which seemed, a generation ago, to put substantive due process to rest.
I was myself inclined to believe even before Roe v. Wade5 and
Doe v. Bolton' that substantive due process has only been allowed
so long to rest inert because the courts have to a degree succeeded
in doing through the equal protection of the law clause what it was
said to be impossible to do under the due process clause. Despite
the overtones of mathematical precision raised by the symbol of
"equality," it must be obvious that for the more crucial applications
of the equal protection notion both before and after Brown v. Board
of Education,7 the mathematical component has been even less decis-
ive than any certainties of social science.
I would not rest this merely on the empirical facts of judicial be-
havior in matters before the courts for decision. For it is clear also
in terms of basic jurisprudential analysis that the precept of equality
is, without more, barren of fruits for the nurture of justice. Few rules
of law can be said to apply equally, in any sense, to all members of
a society. Even seemingly universal prescriptions, for instance in rela-
tion to the trial and punishment of murder, apply only to those who mur-
der. The question whether such a law violates the equal protection
clause depends not just on whether it is justifiable to treat all putative
murderers equally, but mainly on whether the law is justified in separat-
ing off murderers as a class, to be governed by different rules from
other persons.
And if all this seems obvious and of lesser moment as to murder-
ers, it is far from being so for more controversial categories. Working
with the procedural due process notions, the post-Goldberg majorities
categorize some welfare beneficiaries as "privilege-endowed" rather
than "right-endowed,"8 and on this basis withhold from them the pro-
tections of procedural due process.' Is not the effect of this to deprive
those persons thus classified as "privilege-holders" of the equal protec-
tion of the laws? To answer this, further inquiries are needed; and
however we frame them, these further enquiries have finally to focus
on the question-Do the special features of the class of persons thus
subjected to a special rule justify the departure in their ease from the
rules on the same particular subject matter applicable to other mem-
bers of society?
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
9. Id.
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If this be so-and is not this question of the justifiability of the
delimitations of a class for differential legal treatment what the Su-
preme Court's learning as to "suspect classes" is about?-we have
rounded a corner which yields startling views. Justice Tobriner and
his co-author, Harold Cohen, have here offered the thesis that the am-
bit and range of procedural due process protection may have to vary
with the instant subject matter. This of course means that differentia-
tions should be made in the application of the due process require-
ments in relation to particular classes of claims and claimants. Every
such designation of a class would have to be preceded by a decision,
even if only an implicit one, about the justifiability of separating that
class off from other people in relation to the enjoyment of minimal
procedural rights in relation to the particular subject matter.
Moreover, the decision that delimits a particular class for this dif-
ferentiating purpose is not, in itself, part of the act of according or
refusing due process. It is rather, in certain new situations, an ines-
capable decision preliminary to that act; and the subjectivity or other-
wise of that preliminary decision (that is, the unavailability or avail-
ability in Professor Vieira's sense of any precise standards on which
to make the preliminary decision) is basically similar to that which
Professor Vieira thinks should rule out any return by the courts to
substantive due process.
II
It is of the deepest interest that Norman Vieira's dismissal of the
thought of a revival of substantive due process echoes intriguingly an
old campaign of the sixties, led by Herbert Wechsler and the lamented
Henry M. Hart Jr., against kinds of decisions which they vigorously
branded as "unprincipled" or "result-orientated."'10
I believe that the echoings do indeed reflect similar lines of
thought, and that these have again to be clarified and then, in impor-
tant respects, rejected. I have elsewhere exposed the concealed basis
of untenable theory concerning the appellate judicial process which
underlie the Wechsler-Hart positions, as well as Wechsler's concurrent
demand for "neutral principles of constitutional law."" I recall my
colleague Roger Traynor's dry observations of the same period, with
10. See Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84,
98-99 (1959); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001,
1011 (1965); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 1-4Rv.
L. RFv. 1, 19 (1959).
11. See Stone, Result-Orientation and Appellate Judgment, in PERSPECTIVES OF
LAw 347 (R. Pound, E. Griswold, A. Sutherland eds. 1964).
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regard to the Wechsler-Hart positions here under discussion, "that
judges hospitable to the idea of being reasonable would welcome also
some usable standards";12 and on the failure of the advocates of "neu-
tral principles," even with the benefit of hindsight, ever to "compose
such a symphony of neutral principles" as might improve judicial per-
formance. 13  And my own earlier analysis showed that the demand
for "neutral principles," to be then developed by reasoned elaboration,
is the converse side of the condemnation of "result-orientation" in de-
cisions, and that the terms on both sides of this position were rather
hopelessly wide, loose and rolled-up. 4 We must, of course, exclude
decision by lottery as a way, although it is at first blush the simplest
way, of avoiding "result-orientation." We may then concede that
where the court knows that only one principle of law could apply,
and that the terms of that principle are clear in relation to the instant
facts, the judge should undauntedly apply this rule regardless of
whether he likes or dislikes the result of applying it.
But that is rarely if ever the situation which causes the main agon-
izings of appellate judges. In the highly mobile law of our age, the
more usual problem for the judge is, what is the applicable precept?
Or, even if the applicable rule is identified, it is, which of the available
versions of that precept is the applicable one? Or, (and of course this
is crucial for the present symposium) where the heart of the precept
is a broad but basic standard ("equal protection," "due process"), how
are the claims and claimants before the court to be classified in rela-
tion to that standard? I suggest that in these kinds of situations it
is quite unthinkable that courts should be forbidden to consider the
results, for the relations of members of society generally, of choosing
one precept rather than another, or of classifying claims -and claimants
one way rather than another. In these situations, obedience to such
a prohibition would leave the court as a practical matter with only the
recourse to spinning a coin or drawing lots.
Since the able protagonists in -the "neutral principles-anti-result-
orientation" campaign could not have meant this, we must seek the
source of error in their campaign. And this appears to have lain in
two distinct confusions.
The first is as to the range of cases in which appellate courts
can and should avoid looking at results for guidance towards decision.
12. Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do It Justice, 49 CALiF. L. REv. 615, 624
(1961).
13. Id.
14. See note 1 supra.
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Here Wechsler and Hart should have been saying that where there
is only one applicable precept of clear meaning in relation to the in-
stant situation, then the only matter to which the court should have
regard is whether the facts of the situation fall within those predicated
by the precept. In this situation, indeed, it is not the result which
should orientate the court to its decision, but rather the facts and the
precept which should orient the court to the result. This would be
true for this range of cases; but as already seen this is but a minute
part of the problem, which worries all of us. For instance appeals
turning on disputed law are by definition outside it.
Their second confusion is as to the meaning of the notion of "re-
sult-orientation" itself for that bulk of appellate business which thus
lies outside the last paragraph, because the court has to make choices
either between precepts which compete to cover the situation, or be-
tween different versions of a single precept so competing, or in the
application of broad standards like equal protection or due process.
The missionary theses against "result-orientation" have here confused
two quite different ideas. As to one of these the thesis is of momen-
tous importance but also wrong; as to the other it is quite right but
also trivial.
The respect in which it is momentous and wrong is that whenever
an appellate court has to make a choice between available precepts
or versions, or how to classify claims or claimants in relation to a broad
standard, judgment not only may be, but ought to be result-oriented,
in the sense which I immediately proceed to state. This is that where
choices are available, a judge has the responsibility to choose the
best (or most just) result, and that to exercise this responsibility he
must, whatever values he may hold, take into account what will be
the results for members of society generally ("the social order") of
the choices he makes. By members of society generally of course,
I do not mean every member of it individually. According to the li-
tigious subject matter, different classes of members will be affected
by the decision the judge is to reach, and the classes affected will
vary in accordance with the nature and range of his decision. This area
of result-orientation, then, refers to the judge's proper concern for the
justice of the results which will follow for members of society generally
("the social order") when the decision he reaches is generalized be-
yond the instant litigants' particular situation to that of other members
of society."5 When we talk about wisdom and justice of a judgment,
15. See Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard Cases Can Make
[Vol. 25
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this certainly embraces the wisdom and justice of the results which
it thus achieves for society.
By the same token, however, to reach results on the basis of those
facts of a litigant's situation which have no bearing on the justice of
the matter, for instance that the judge prefers blondes or that a party
is breathtakingly beautiful or repulsively ugly,16 is to reach results
which could not with approval be offered as a precept applicable to
members of society generally. In this kind of situation, the results
for the litigants taken into account simply would not qualify as a partic-
ular example of just results envisaged for members of society generally.
It is for this last kind of situation that, as observed above, general
denunciation of result-orientation in appellate judgment is right
though rather trivial. But, beyond this trivial situation and the modest
case where there is only a single applicable precept clear in its appli-
cation to the instant facts (also mentioned above) ,'17 it is clear that
result-orientation in appellate judgment is not only proper, it is also
a duty inseparable from the responsibilities which goes with judicial
choice-making.1
8
It is by way of a further corollary from this that we need to re-
ceive with caution charges of "unprincipled" decision-making, in the
pejorative sense which Professor Vieira applies it to substantive due
process. Insofar as this refers to the absence of any precise indubit-
able applicable principle or standard of law, it is a criticism of the
condition of the law, and it would be applicable to many other parts
of the law which do not provoke the kind of hostility which surrounds
substantive due process. I shall return later to this matter. 9
One final point of theory is here to be made. Whenever an
appellate court has to make choices as to applicable law or as to the
Good Law, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 223, 234 (1962), where Justice Traynor writes: "[A
judge] comes to realize how essential it is . . . that he be intellectually interested in
a rational outcome. He cannot remain disoriented forever, his mind suspended between
alternative passable solutions. Rather than taking the easy way out via one or the
other, he can strive to deepen his inquiry and his reflection enough to arrive at last
at a value judgment as to what the law ought to be and to spell out why. In the
course of doing so he channels his interest in a rational outcome into an interest in
a particular result. In that limited sense he becomes result-oriented. Would we want
it otherwise? Would we give up the value judgment for the non-commitment of the
two-faced coin?"
16. I assume, of course, that the degree of the parties' pulchritude is not other-
wise part of what the litigation is about.
17. See text accompanying and immediately following note 14 supra.
18. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Guistizia; or Hard Cases Can Make
Good Law, 29 U. Cm. L REv. 223, 234 (1962).
19. See text accompanying notes 25-32 infra.
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application of a standard, a critical part of its task is the delimitation
of the persons who should be placed notionally in a class together for
the purpose of doing justice. This is so quite apart from the constitu-
tional precept of equal protection of the laws. It is so for example
in the cultivation of common law rules. When the question is whether
Rylands v. Fletcher21 strict liability applies to defendants or plaintiffs
other than landowners, the question is whether some characteristic
other than landownership should become the criterion of the class or
classes to which the rule applies. This is also true when constitutional
and common law precepts interact. The critical point of New York
Times v. Sullivan"' was the indication of a class of plaintiffs whom
justice was held to require shall be more fully exposed than others
to remediless defamatory statements. Similarly a holding under the
due process clause that an official act arbitrarily and unreasonably de-
prives the claimants of life, liberty or property necessarily involves
(even when this is not expressed) characterization of the claimants
(that is, the delimitation of a class in the community by reference to
characteristics which are shared with the claimants), and a holding
that those characteristics do not in justice warrant the detriment im-
posed by the official act. This, too, will be important for the later
part of this Introduction.22
It may be worth considering, in light of all this, whether the signs
of a restirring of substantive due process in the 1973 abortion cases
should be given the rather short shrift which Professor Vieira's article
offers. It may well be that if the courts were able and willing to do
consistently through the equal protection clause what I have above
shown to be implicit in some of their operations with it, a revival of
substantive due process would serve no purpose. A similar conclusion
might be warranted if courts were always willing to recognize, as the
substantive judgments which they are, their preliminary decisions as
to whether particular claimants in novel cases are to be classified in
a way which allows differential treatment of them as regards the rights
of procedural due process generally available to others.
So far as there is little prospect of courts consistently achieving
such analytical clarity, something may remain to be said in tolerance
20. 3 H & C 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (Ex. 1865), rev'd, L.R. I Ex 265 (1866),
aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (868).
21. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22. See text accompanying notes 33-39 infra.
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or even in encouragement of a revival of substantive due process re-
view. Such a revival would be accompanied no doubt by resort to
various rules of thumb for preventing the excessive build-up of chal-
lenges, by reference to the gravity or level of injustice of official action
needed to activate the court, or to presumptions analogous to those
affecting "suspect" and other classifications in relation to the equal
protection clause. But even hedged about thus, substantive due proc-
ess might well still catch major injustices which, as this symposium
shows, at present slip through the net of other provisions.
My main point, however, is still another. Insofar as, even without
substantive due process, judicial determination of the standards of
minimal justice in any case pervades review of legislative' and execu-
tive action under other constitutional provisions, the fact that such
standards have to be made explicit whenever substantive due process
is used would be a positive gain. It could promote less concealed
and more sophisticated decisions also in other areas where the rele-
vance of judgments of justice is too often concealed, even when it
is inescapable. I shall later suggest that "reasoned elaboration" is a
desideratum for principles of justice, as well as principles of law.2 3
And I here make the preparatory point that this is only possible for
either principles of justice or principles of law, when the principles
are recognized for what they are and are adequately articulated.
IV
It is well-known, if too often forgotten, that the ingenuity and
persistence of counsel, no less than outlook and background of judges,
have helped to determine which constitutional standards shall from
time to time flourish and extend their protective limbs, and which shall
rest or even die back. The skill and imagination of later nineteenth
century corporation counsel had a great deal to do with the sweeping
spread of substantive due process protection against the first half cen-
tury of social legislation.2 4
It is thus the more salutary to recall, especially at turning points
of constitutional doctrine, that whichever standard is invoked in aid
23. See text in Part VII, pp. 798-800 infra.
24. Cases like Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908), Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), initiated or contributed to the rise of substantive due
process. It is perhaps problematic yet nevertheless enlightening to note that some fifty-
five federal statutes and 228 state statutes were invalidated during the period of 1890-
1937. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTrTiONAL Lxw: A TnxTBooK 167 (1972). And see note
18 infra.
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of particular claims, one core issue seems to lie in wait. This is
whether the setting apart of some persons, as a class to be subjected
to different legal rules in regard to the particular matters, is justifiable
in the sense that the outcome of this classification is tolerably just.
And, of course, the answer to this question depends upon the question
whether the features which differentiate the class thus designated from
other members of the community call, in terms of some level of de-
sired justice of the results, for the different legal rules applied. This
core issue may become explicit in technical legal pronouncements, as
in the identification of "suspect" classes in relation to the equal protec-
tion clause, or it may there remain cryptic in unspoken assumptions.
V
What is to be said about due process, procedural and substantive,
in such a nontechnical jurisprudential perspective?
First, I think we can identify some due process issues and con-
texts which are purely procedural in the strictest sense. These are
issues of observance in stereotyped litigious situations of principles as
to due notice of the adversary's case,2 5 impartiality of the judge,2 6 the
right of a party to be heard,2 7 and the like, such as are canvassed
in interesting consideration here by James P. Barber and Philip R.
Bates, of the standing of videotaped testimony and, by Professor Mor-
ris D. Forkosch, of de novo review in administrative hearings. Simi-
larly, Sheldon Portman and Richard Alexander point out the existence
(or nonexistence) of such principles in California's procedure of in-
dictment by grand jury. We can think of this area in either of two
ways. We may regard these principles as absolute in a natural law
sense. Anglo-American judges indeed called them "principles of na-
tural justice, ' 28 quite independently of their embodiment in constitu-
tions. If we balk at natural law language, then we have to say that
in the indicated situations procedural due process means two things
together. It means that as to them no separate classification of some
members of the community can ever warrant departure from the prin-
, ciples. In other words, the presumption that separate classification
of persons for this purpose is vicious is an irrebutable presumption.
25. E.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196
(1948).
26. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
27. E.g., Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
28. See generally J. STONE, HUMAN LAW AND HUMAN JusTICE 36-81, 193-226 (2d
ed. 1968).
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It means, secondly, that as to those principles, not even a universal
abrogation, depriving all members of the community equally of them,
is permissible. Even granted, as it were, that such a universal abroga-
tion might be consistent with "equal protection of the laws," it would
still violate procedural due process. These due process principles are
in this last sense procedural minima pure and simple, failure in which
is always intolerable.
Second, however, wherever questions arise (as with the welfare
benefit or prisoner cases) of whether such procedural minima apply
beyond their stereotyped ambit to new areas of administrative or liti-
gious determination of claims or claimants, it is an illusion to think
that only procedural due process is involved. Whether the areas are
new in the sense of social innovation (welfare, housing, etc.) or only
in the sense that problems are newly discovered (prisoners, mental pa-
tients or women and children as to some matters), the heart of the
issue is not purely procedural but mixed with a preliminary determina-
tion of substantive justice. It lies rather in the substantive preliminary
question-What features (if any) of the situations of the new claims
or claimants, justify separating them off as a class to which in justice
the benefits of the procedural minima need not be extended? The
procedural due process issue is here conditioned, in short, on a deter-
mination of substantive justice for or against the new claims or claim-
ants.
Different from either of the preceding is the discredited notion
of substantive due process associated in earlier decades with the sanc-
tification of liberty of contract and of property rights which checked
the early growth of social legislation. 9 As the Supreme Court majorities
of the opening decades of the century interpreted it, the due process
clause forbade the taking away of life, liberty or property "arbitrarily and
unreasonably."30 Whatever this indeterminate category meant, the pro-
hibition was obviously directed to setting limits on state and federal
power to redistribute or reallocate the resources of the community, or
otherwise compensate various economically underprivileged groups.3
In this context "arbitrary and unreasonable' might conceivably
29. E.g., Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522
(1923); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisi-
ana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
30. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
31. For a summary of the legislation invalidated during this period, see CoNsT-
TUTION OF THE UNniu STATES 1431-85 (Government Printing Office, 1964 ed.).
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mean that the legislator (or other official actor) had no reason for
taking the action impugned. The effect of adopting this meaning,
as the supposed demise of substantive due process later illustrated,
would be that judicial review is virtually excluded, since cases where
officials do not have any reason at all for acting are rare indeed. The
different view which dominated during the heyday of substantive due
process was that action was arbitrary and unreasonable when the rea-
sons for the action are such as do not respect the "basic" or "fundamen-
tal" or "natural" rights of the complainants, or the "principles of nat-
ural law" or "natural justice" or the "fundamental principles of jus-
tice" or some similar criteria. Whatever the criteria adopted, the op-
position which gave a quietus to substantive due process, and which
now resists its revival, bases itself on the ground that such criteria
merely cloaked the subjective reactions of judges partial to business
and property interests, that the doctrine of substantive due process thus
led to "unprincipled decision making," and that once unleashed the doc-
trine "cannot easily be controlled," and would lead simply to the invalida-
tion of any official action about which five Justices feel strongly enough.32
VI
It is the fact, of course, that the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade 3 did
rely on the due process clause,34 in combination with the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, 5 and the right of
privacy6 already spelled out in Griswold v. Connecticut3 7 from various
emanations of several heads of the Bill of Rights. It is also clear that
Justice Blackmun, writing for the seven to two majority, did, in striking
down the statutory provisions, take the ground that where "certain
fundamental rights are involved . . . regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a compelling state interest." 38  So that Profes-
sor Vieira may be correct in regarding Roe v. Wade as holding that
substantive due process still lives, to the point of protecting rights and
32. See, e.g., Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335
U.S. 525 (1949), disapproving Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) wherein the
Court, with four justices dissenting, struck down a state law prohibiting the maintenance
of private employment agencies. The majority found that such businesses were highly
beneficial to the public, and therefore held that the state's proscription was a denial
of due process.




37. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
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freedoms, such as a woman's right to terminate her own pregnancy,
even when these are not explicitly protected by the Constitution.
I am not here concerned with that writer's views as to freedom
of abortion or possible analogies between this and drug and other
problems or with his criticisms of the extravagancies of judicial review
in the decades leading up to the New Deal. I am concerned, however,
as I have already indicated, with .that ground of his denunciation of
substantive due process which claims that it necessarily leads to "un-
principled" decision-making. For I must return to the point already
made that if this is a sufficient reason for wholesale rejection of sub-
stantive due process, it must also be a good reason for saying that
the equal protection of the law clause necessarily leads to "unprin-
cipled" decision-making. For in both cases the decisive question is
always whether the class of claimants or claims affected by legislative
(or administrative) action has features which can be said to justify, at
some level of stringency or other, the special treatment accorded to them
by the impugned law.
So that if "unprincipled" here means that the decision is not de-
rived from principles of law, the charge is correct-but it is correct
for the equal protection of the law as well as for substantive due proc-
ess cases, just as we have seen it also is for what I have called "mixed"
procedural due process cases. The mere fact that it is commonly
thought that equal protection stands wholly on its own legal legs cannot
alter the compulsions arising from correct analysis. And I found it
fascinating that Professor Vieira himself should almost concede this
point in the very midst of his strictures against substantive due process.
This is in relation to the case of San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez"9 in which, in 1973, school financing based on local
(rather than state-wide) property -tax revenues was unsuccessfully at-
tacked. The issue there, he says, was cast in terms of equal protec-
tion (that is, of every child's equal right to an adequately financed
education). But he adds (and this is the point) "the claim presented
was basically one of substantive due process." I would emphatically
agree for the above reason. And that reason may, I believe, invite
us to be far more tolerant about reconsidering the role which substan-
tive due process may still have to play at the present stage of social
development, radically different as our situation is from that of the
pre-New Deal eras.
The need for reconsideration arises not just because the Supreme
39. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Court has seemed to exclude fields such as education, 40 housing and
welfare benefits,41 towards which we may feel protective, from the
reach of substantive due process. It is not merely that we may dis-
approve holdings which favour values opposed to our own and approve
those which favour our own. It is rather that, on a correct analysis
of what such decisions prerequire, the grounds offered for excising
substantive due process from the constitutional armoury would also
command excision of equal protection of the laws.
In the sense in which we can say that decisions as to the range
of beneficiaries of the equal protection clause are "principled," the prin-
ciples involved are not principles of law, but principles of just deci-
sion, of open-minded inquiry, diligent and honest fact-finding, and
recognition of the diverse and often conflicting values which compete
as guides to minimal justice in the way in which people are classified
for the purpose of imposing legal burdens or conferring legal benefits.
Justice, as the standard of evaluation of law, whether in constitutional
or other contexts, does not hover apart from the facts. It is somehow
interwoven with them, in all their complexity. Insofar as the due
/ process clause prerequires determination of the justice of classification
offered by the law, it also commands attention to the actual relations
of men of the time and place in their actual environment, and to the
effects of the impugned law and its machinery upon those relations.
To attempt to extrude the search for justice in this sense from consti-
tutional decisions, because the decisions are not based on legal prin-
ciples, may be to pluck out the eye that sees, and which offends only
because we do not wish to see.
Vii
I am saying, then, that whatever be the surrounding technicalities
or indeterminacies, standards like due process and equal protection
properly and necessarily refer the judges, as well as the citizenry to
the enquiry whether the impugned measures produce results intoler-
ably unjust according to the ethical convictions of the time and place.
Of course, such injustice may be most frequently perceived as regards
rights sanctified by the Bill of Rights: after all, it is because those
rights have been so highly valued that they were so sanctified. But
that does not mean that the convictions of later generations may not
recognize gross invasions of other rights as also productive of intoler-
40. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
41. E.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405
U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (welfare).
[Vol. 25
able injustice. And this is perhaps one final meaning of what the
majority held in Roe v. Wade.
The judicial perception of intolerable injustice in such cases must
necessarily be "result-oriented," in that its enquiry is whether the class
designated to be governed by the impugned rules has the specific fea-
tures warranting, in terms of justice, the application of these special rules
to them. It is from the absence of such features that the finding of intol-
erable injustice proceeds. And when that finding is made, it is a finding
of injustice to all members of the class, and not merely to the instant
plaintiffs. To condemn "result-orientation" in general is (as was shown
in section II above) to confuse the proper and inevitable consideration
of the consequences of judgment for the community, with the classical
phgnomne Magnaud, where judgment goes according to the results
for this particular litigant, regardless of the results of the decision for
the community generally. Just as judgment can and should be prin-
cipled on the level of justice, so it can and should be "result-orienta-
ted" in terms of the results which the rule applied will bring for all
persons within its reach when it is generalized as a community norm.
And I see no ground for thinking that "reasoned elaboration," which
is correctly thought to be a hallmark of good appellate judicial law-
saying, may not go on in the kind of cases under consideration, just
as it does in the judicial handling of more traditional statutory or com-
mon law rules.
It is true, of course, that the criteria of justice in general are de-
batable, though I add that the criteria of intolerable injustice in a given
time and place are less so-as much work of the Supreme Court and
a number of state courts shows. It is also true that the case to case
elaboration of criteria of intolerable injustice may be distorted and
abused in various ways. The data available may be inadequate for
classifying or for determining the results of choice. The strength of
conviction, or closedmindedness of judges may lead to bias and distor-
tion in their selection among the available data. The question of jus-
tice may be begged, as Barbara Brudno has all but suggested it was,
in the cases42 cutting back Goldberg v. Kelly, by a kind of "reconstruc-
tion" of the facts. And even when these and other vices are not pres-
ent, the best of judges will still often divide on these grave and far-
reaching questions, somewhat more than they do much of the time
about everyday questions of law.
There is thus ground for some discomfort about the uncertainties
42. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
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which experience shows to arise in the application of both the equal
protection and due process clauses in our rapidly changing conditions.
And the very detailed chart included in Ms. Ann Fagan Ginger's ar-
ticle helps to illustrate the vacillation engaged in by the courts in the
due process field as a result of these uncertainties. It has, indeed,
been recently charged by some Australians who oppose the proposed
adoption there of a statutory bill of rights, -that the price of such a
Bill of Rights is "eternal litigation." This is a telling quip directed
of course at the United States experience. But I fear that it defeats
itself. I hope that neither the United States nor Australia will ever
come to scoff at human liberty merely because the price of liberty
is eternal vigilance. The preservation of liberty and the avoidance
of intolerable levels of injustice in our society are inseparable condi-
tions of what most of us regard as a "good" society. Both demand
eternal vigilance; and if this entails eternal litigation, so be it!
